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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DORIS CYPERT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, SHELDON B. JOHN-
SON, FINDLY M. JUDD, FRED-
~JRICK R. BRUECK, GARY T. 
MOORE, DR. \V ALTER H. SNOW, 
RONALD V. McARTHUR and T. 
LAVOY ESPLIN, 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Respondent, a 
resident qualified voter of Washington County, Utah, 
brought on behalf of herself and all other similarly situ-
ated persons residing within the boundaries of Washing-
ton County School District, Utah, who did not pay a tax 
on property located in Washington County School Dis-
trict within the twelve months preceding May 27, 1969, 
against the Board of Educ a ti on of Washington County 
School District to enjoin the issuance of certain school 
1 
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building bonds voted at a bond election held and co11• 
ducted by the Defendants-Appellants on May 27 1969 
' ' 
and to declare invalid those portions of Article XIV 
' 
Section 3, of the Utah Constitution and Sections 11-14-2 
and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
which might limit the right to vote at bond elections to 
those electors who have paid a property tax therein dur-
ing the twelve months preceding the election. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial of the cause on December 12, 1969, the 
District Court of Washington County, after entering a 
memorandum decision on April 2, 1970, entered a judg-
ment and decree on April 14, 1970, (1) enjoining De-
fendants-Appellants from issuing or selling the bonds 
voted at the May 27, 1969, bond election, (2) declaring 
those portions of Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitu-
tion, and Sections 11-14-2 and 11-14-5, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, which limit the right to vote 
at bond elections to electors who had paid property taxes 
on property located in the political subdivision within 
twelve months preceding the date of the bond election 
to be void and in violation of the United States Consti-
tution, ( 3) declaring that the aforesaid provisions of 
Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and Sections 
11-14-2 and 11-14-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, requiring such taxpayer vote are severable 
from the remainder of such sections and that Defendants-
Appellants may validly hold bond elections as long as the 
right to vote is not limited to taxpayers only, and ( 4) that 
such decision would apply prospectively only aud would 
2 
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not affect the validity of any bond election or bonds 
where the bond election contest period provided by Utah 
law had expired prior to .June 16, 1969. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of so much of 
the judgment of the District Court of Washington 
County as enjoins Defendants from selling or issuing 
the honds voted at the May 27, 1969, election and de-
C'lares that portion of the Constitution and statutes of 
the State of Utah which limit the right to vote at bond 
\'lections to those qualified electors who had paid a tax 
on property located within a political subdivision within 
twelve months of the date of the election to be unconsti-
tutional and void, but respectfully asks that if this Court 
affirms the judgment of the District Court of Washing-
ton County on such counts, then this court affirm the 
portions of the judgment holding the aforesaid provi-
sions of the Constitution and statutes of the State of 
l'tah to be severable and permitting elections to be held 
as long as the right to vote is not limited to taxpayers 
only and further affirm the portion of the judgment 
holding that any such decision applies prospectively 
only. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff-Respondent is a resident of Washington 
County, Utah, and as such, a resident of Washington 
County School District. She is a qualified, registered 
rlector of the County, but, during the twelve month 
3 
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period immediately preceding May 27, 1969, did not own 
property located within the boundaries of Washington 
County School District, the title to which was listed in 
her name on the tax rolls of Washington County, Utah, 
nor did she during said twelve month period pay a prop-
erty tax to Washington County or to Washington County 
School District. 
On April 8, 1969, the Defendants-Appellants adopt-
ed a resolution (See Exhibit A, R.12), calling a special 
bond election to be held in Washington County School 
District, Utah, during legal hours on May 27, 1969, upon 
the issuance of bonds in the amount of $1,000,000, to 
mature serially in not more than twenty years from their 
date, and to bear interest at a rate or rates not exceed-
ing 6% per annum, for the purpose of raising money 
for purchasing school sites, for building or purchasing 
one or more school houses and supplying the same with 
furniture and necessary apparatus, and for improving 
school property under the charge of the Board of 
Education. 
By the terms of the resolution of April 8, 1969 and 
the notice of election set forth in the resolution and in 
accordance with the provisions of Article XIV, Section 
3, Utah Constitution and of Sections 11-14-2 and 11-14-5, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Defendants-Appellants 
provided that only such qualified electors of the Wash-
ington County School District as had paid a property 
tax in the school district within the twelve months pre-
ceding the date of the special bond election would be per-
mitted to cast a ballot at such election on the proposition 
4 
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of the issuance of such bonds. Defendants-Appellants 
provided in said notice of election that qualified, regi-
stered electors of the school district presenting them-
selves at the polls at the special bond election on May 
27, 1969, could establish that they paid a property tax 
on property situated within the boundaries of the said 
school district during the hvelve months immediately 
preceding the date of the election either by exhibiting a 
receipt of the County Treasurer of Washington County, 
rtah, (in the form of a tax notice appropriately stamped 
by the County Treasurer to show payment of such tax) 
or, in the alternative, by taking an oath, with or without 
legal challenge, under the pains and penalties of perjury, 
that i:-mch person offering to vote at the bond election 
had within twelve months preceding May 27, 1969, paid 
a tax on property located in the school district the title 
to which was held in his name according to the assess-
ment roll of Washington County, Utah, in the form in 
which said oath was set out at length in Section 9 of the 
aforesaid resolution of April 8, 1969. The election on 
Jfay 27, 1969 was, in fact, conducted in accordance with 
these limitations. (See section 3 of Exhibit D, Resolution 
Canvassing Vote of June 3, 1969; Finding of Fact 3, 
H.89-90). 
Plaintiff-Respondent was unable to comply with the 
limitations on voting established by the Board of Educa-
tion. She could not legally and properly execute the tax-
paypr oath and could not present evidence of payment 
of the required tax. Accordingly, Plaintiff-Respondent 
dicl not vote at the special bond election (Tr. 6). 
5 
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The special bond election was held on May 27, 196~1 
and on June 3, 1969 the returns were canvassed by the 
Defendants-Appellants. (See Exhibit D, Finding of Fact 
7, R. 90-91). It was determined that a majority of the 
persons voting at such special bond election voted in favor 
of the issuance of $1,000,000 general obligation school 
building bonds of the school district. The Defendants-Ap-
pellants found that only qualified registered electors of 
the Washington County School District who had paid a 
property tax therein in the twelve months preceding the 
election were permitted to vote at the election. 
On September 22, 1969 the Defendants-AppellantR 
adopted a resolution authorizing the issuance of $400,000 
School Building Bonds, Series of December 1, 1969, of 
the Board of Education of Washington County School 
District, being part of the $1,000,000 bonds authorized 
at the May 27, 1969, special bond election. (See Exhibit 
B, R. 29-40; Finding of Fact 8, R. 91). In Section 7 of 
said resolution of September 22, the Def endants-Ap-
pellants authorized and directed the Clerk of the Board 
of Education to contact potential purchasers of the $400,-
000 bonds therein authorized, and to supply all necessary 
information to such potential purchasers so that bids for 
the sale of the bonds could be submitted to the defendant 
Board of Education for consideration and acceptance. 
On June 16, 1969, subsequent to the special bond 
election held in Washington County School District and 
conducted by the Defendants-Appellants, and subsequent 
to the canvass of the results of said special bond election. 
6 
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but prior to the expiration of the forty-day period com-
puted from the date the returns of the election are can-
nissed and the results thereof declared within which 
Section 11-14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, permits 
rlection contests to be filed challenging bond elections, 
t]JP United States Supreme Court handed down opinions 
in two cases relating to the validity, under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, of state restrictions 
on qualifications to vote at certain local elections. The 
two cases decided on June 16, 1969, are Kramer v. Union 
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 23 L. Ed.2d 583, 89 
S.Ct. 1886 (1969), and Cipria!Ylo v. City of Houma, 395 
U.S. 701, 23 L.Ed. 2d 647, 89 S.Ct. 1897 (1969). In both 
cases the Supreme Court of the United States held cer-
tain state statutes which restricted the right to vote at 
the local elections involved to qualified electors who also 
qualified as the owners of property upon which ad val-
orem taxes were paid, to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
The Kramer case, dealt with the right to vote at 
school elections generally, but the Cipriano case dealt 
with the right to vote at an election held upon the ques-
tion of the issuance of municipal electric utility revenue 
bonds. 
In the Cipriano case the Supreme Court of the 
Fnited States, after holding the provisions of Louisiana 
law which limit the right to vote at revenue bond elec-
tions to qualified, taxpaying electors to be in violation 
7 
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of the Federal Constitution, and hence the election at 
which the bonds in question were approved to be invalid 
' 
null and void, nevertheless specified that its decision 
would not be fully retroactive. The pertinent portion 
of the language of the court at page 652 discussing the 
prospective nature of its opinion is quoted as follows: 
Significant hardships would be imposed on 
cities, bondholders, and others connected with 
municipal utilities if our decision today were 
given full retroactive effect. Where a decision of 
this Court could produce substantial inequitable 
results if applied retroactively, there is ample 
basis in our cases for avoiding the "injustice or 
hardship'' by a holding of nonretroactivity. Great 
Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Cu., 
287 U.S. 358, 364, 77 L.Ed. 360, 366, 53 S. Ct. 145, 
85 A.L.R. 254 (1932). See Chicot County Drainage 
Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 84 L.E<l. 
329, 60 S.Ct. 317 (1940). Cf. Linkletter v. Walker, 
381 U.S. 618, 14 L.Ed. 2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731 (1965). 
Therefore, we will apply our decision in this casP 
prospectively. That is, we will apply it only where, 
under state law, the time for challenging the 
election results has not expired, or in cases 
brought within the time specified by state law for 
challenging the election and which are not yet 
final. Thus, the decision will not apply where the 
authorization to issue the securities is legally 
complete on the date of this decision. Of cours:, 
our decision will not affect the validity of securi-
ties which have been sold or issued prior to this 
decision and pursuant to such final authorization. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 11-14-12, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, the period for bringing an election 
contest under Utah law challenging the results and 
8 
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validity of the May 27, 1969, special bond election con-
ducted by Defendants-Appellants expired on July 14, 
1%9. The Plaintiff-Respondent suing on behalf of herself 
and all other similarly situated persons who are resi-
dents of Washington County School District, but who 
did not own property located within the boundaries of 
the "\Vashington County School District on which they 
had paid a tax within twelve months of the May 27, 
1969, election held and conducted by Def endants-Ap-
pellants, filed suit against the Defendants-Appellants on 
December 4, 1969, which date was after the expiration 
of the 40-day bond election contest period provided in 
the Utah Municipal Bond Act by Section 11-14-12, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN HOLD-
ING THAT AS TO GENERAL OBLIGATION 
BOND ELECTIONS THE TAXPAYER VOT-
ING REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE XIV, 
SECTION 3, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION AND OF SECTIONS 11-14-2 AND 11-14-
5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS 
AMENDED, VIOLATES THE EQUAL PRO-
TECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
It is submitted that the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
Pnited States, as recently interpreted by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Kramer and CipriMw, does 
9 
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not support the holding by the court below that Articlr 
XIV, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution and Section~ 
11-14-2 and 11-14-5 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, which require a taxpayer vote on the question 
of incurring indebtedness, are unconstitutional as ap-
plied to general obligation bond elections. The Kramer 
and Cipriano opinions were not concerned with elections 
on the issuance of general obligation bonds. Kramer was 
wholly unrelated to the issuance of bonds and Cipriano 
was concerned only with the issuance of revenue bonds, 
and they are therefore not authority for invalidating the 
provisions of the Utah Constitution and statutes which 
require that only property taxpaying electors may vote 
at general obligation bond elections. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Cipriano opinion was very careful to limit its opinion 
to the revenue bond situation, the Court declaring in 
Footnote 5 at page 651 : 
As in Kramer v. Union Free School District 
No. 15, U.S. , 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 S.Ct. 
, we find it unnecessary to decide whether a 
state might, in some circumstances, limit the 
franchise to those "primarily interested." 
It is apparent therefore that the Supreme Court of 
the United States went out of its way in the Cipriano 
opinion to indicate that its decision was not to be applied 
to types of bond elections other than the revenue bond 
type of election before the Court in that case. 
The court below was therefore in error in determin-
ing that the opinion in the Cipria!flo case is determinafo·e 
10 
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of the validity of the porvisions of the Utah Constitution 
and :statutes which limit the right to vote at general obli-
gation bond elections to taxpayers. On the contrary, it 
is submitted that there are ample valid constitutional 
grounds for reaching the contrary result and therefore 
it is requested that this Court find and hold that the 
l~qnal Protection Clause is not violated by the present 
yoter qualification provisions of the Utah Constitution 
and statutes as applied to general obligation bond 
elections. 
The rationale for holding that the constitution-
al theory of K ra.mer and Cipria'Y/,o should not ap-
pl~· to a case involving a general obligation bond 
election rests in the significant difference between 
general obligation bonds and revenue bonds. While the 
debt represented by the latter is payable only from the 
l'C\'enues generated by the project constructed with the 
bond proceeds, the debt represented by general obliga-
tion bonds is legally payable from taxes levied only upon 
property owners. Section 11-14-19 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides that all bonds 
not payable solely from revenues constitute full general 
obligations to which the full faith and credit of the poli-
tical subdivision is pledged, and further provides that 
such bonds enjoy an obligation on the part of the issuing 
entity to levy and collect annually ad valorem taxes with-
out limitation as to rate or amount fully sufficient for the 
purpose. Furthermore, it is provided in Sections 59-10-3 
aud 59-10-42 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
that taxes are made a lien on the property of a taxpayer 
and that such lieu may be foreclosed upon for the pur-
11 
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pose of collecting delinquent taxes. Therefore, through 
the obligor on a general obligation bond may nominally 
be the issuing entity, in effect it is a composite of the 
property taxpayers who, because of their ownership of 
property, can be taxed for the entire payment of the , 
principal and interest on the bonds. Failure to pay the 
tax can lead to the loss of the property. It is these facts 
which provide the very critical difference between the 
nature of the general obligation bonds involved in this 
appeal and those voted at the revenue bond electoin con-
tested in Cipriano, and it is because of this difference that 
the Defendants-Appellants seek to have this Court re-
verse the court below and hold constitutional the prop-
erty taxpayer requirements of Utah law. 
When disallowing the limitation of the franchise in 
revenue bond elections in the Cipriano case, the United 
States Supreme Court itself emphasized the significance 
of this difference between revenue and general obliga-
tion bonds. In reaching the conclusion that the benefits 
and burdens of a revenue bond issue fall indiscriminately 
on both property owners and non-property owners alike, 
the Court emphasized that this conclusion was reached 
because, inter-alia, of the fundamental characteristics 
of revenue bonds. The language of the Court at page 
651 is as follows : 
The revenue bonds are to be paid only from 
the operations of the utilities; they are not financ-
ed in any way by property tax revenue. Prop~r:ty 
owners, like non-property owners, use the utilities 
and pay the rates ; however, the impact on them 
is unconnected to their status as property tax-
payers. 
12 
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By using this approach to demonstrate the irrationality 
of the state's determination that property taxpayers are 
more greatly affected by the issuance of revenue bonds 
than are non-property taxpayers, the United States 
Supreme Court distinguished bonds ''financed'' by prop-
erty tax revenues from the effect of its holding. In mak-
ing this distinction the Court indirectly, yet clearly, 
Rustained the viability of the property taxpayer require-
ment in general obligation bond elections; and, therefore, 
it must be said that if the Cipriano decision concerns 
general obligation bond elections at all, it tends to en-
force rather than deny the validity of the property tax-
payer requirement in such elections. 
In Cipriano, the United States Supreme Court allud-
0d to the Kramer case saying that in Kramer it had stat-
ed that "the Court must determine whether the exclu-
sions are necessary to promote a compelling state in-
terest" in determining the constitutionality of a state 
statute which grants the right to vote in a limited pur-
pose election to some otherwise qualified voters and 
denies it to others. As a guideline or test to be used in 
determining whether or not the compelling state interest 
exists, the Court explained that an examination must be 
made as to whether or not those otherwise qualified 
Yoters who are excluded are ''in fact substantially less 
interested or affected than those the statute includes.'' 
In determining the unconstitutionality of the property 
taxpayer requirement in revenue bond elections the Court 
noted that the exclusion of non-property taxpayers could 
not withstand the scrutiny of this examination, but to 
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make this determination the Court did, as already men-
tioned, distinguish general obligation bonds. In effect, 
through its reasoning in the Cipriano case, the Unit!'J 
States Supreme Court seems to haYe answered the \ery 
question presented in the case at hand. 
\Yhile it may be conceded that the benefits reaped 
from the issuance of general obligation school bonds fall 
indiscriminately upon all residents of the community, 
both property taxpayers and non-property taxpayers 
alike, legally the burden falls entirely upon those tax-
payers who will pronde the funds for the payment of 
the principal of and the interest on the bonds. While 
non-property tax-payers may haYe a subjectin "in-
terest'' in the issuance of general obligation bonds, it 
must be said that because they haYe no pa1i in the pay-
ment of principal and interest on these bonds they are 
•' substautiall~- less interested or affected·· than the 
propert~- taxpayers who legally carry the entire burden 
of repayment of the bond issue together with interest 
thereon. 
\Yhen a public project is financed with rewnue 
bonds. such as the utility system with which the Court 
was concerned in Cip1·ia110. all residents of the community 
are burdened and benefited irrespecfr1,·e of their o"ner-
ship of property. ~\s the Court mentioned in Cipriani'. 
the burden might be in the t\wrn of increased. rate:S if 
the bonds :.u-e Yoted and the benefit might be in the form 
of an addition to the funds of the general CtJffers of the 
eity if the utility s~·stern should generate a profit after 
the payment of debt sen·ice on the bonds and other ex-
1-1 
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lft:DSt'S of operation. Further benefit could accrue to all 
i>t>l':rnse of better utility sernce resulting from the ex-
, t'illitnre of the bond proceeds. But what the Court was 
Li': faced with in Cipriano, but which does exist in this 
J~'peal. is the O\erwhelming burden placed upon prop-
crt:· taxpayers by rtah law if the bonds are issued, com-
:'<Hed with the fact that the law places no comparable 
:.;11\ll'n upon non-property taxpayers. While both prop-
,r':- taxpayers and non-property taxpayers can benefit 
• i ,1m new public projects financed with general obliga-
r:(,L bonds, it is the property taxpayers solely who are 
iei:ally required to pay the costs of financing those 
!'J'<:)jects. 
Though the Plaintiff-Respondent argues that she 
:1•0 will in some minimal degree share in payment of the 
,.l,:'t:' of debt ser\ice on the bonds because of the fact that 
'De pay::; other taxes (such as sales taxes) to the state, 
<ilid the Legislature deposits some of these taxes in the 
~'ate school fund and ultimately these are distributed 
:c1 school districts, neYertheless the Legislature ordering 
·i:e collection and distribution of these taxes is one com-
!11,sed of representatiYes elected by all qualified \Oters. 
;,,,,h property taxpayers and non-property taxpayers 
a'.ikP. It cannot, therefore, be said that by \oting for the 
:~rnance of general obligation school bonds. the property 
:a:s:payers in the school district haYe imposed a burden 
,i;_ persons who pay no taxes on property within tht' 
'cl:ool district. The burden on such non-taxpayers is not 
:!1e burden of tax le\·ies to repay the bond issue but is 
:'...e burden of a general tax impost'd by a body of repre-
,.:.nati ,·es elected by all qualified Yoters. 
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\Vith full knowledge that the entire burden of a 
general obligation bond issue would fall solely upo1J 
property taxpayers, the framers of the Utah Constitu-
tion and the members of the Utah Legislature must be 
said to have had a constitutionally valid compelling in-
terest for limiting the franchise to property taxpayers 
in general obligation bond elections. This is the objectin 
of the state policy, and it is clear that the voting classifi-
cation chosen is necessary to attain this objective. 
Harper v. Virginia, State Board of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 16 L.Ed.2d 169, 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966) is related 
to the case at hand because in its most general sense it 
concerns the payment of moneys as a prerequisite to vot-
ing. In Harper the United States Supreme Court con-
cluded "that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the 
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral 
standard.'' 
What was before the Court in Harper was a poll tax, 
the enforcement of which took the form of disenfran-
chisement of those who did not pay it. The payment of 
the tax was unrelated to the matter being voted upon at 
the election. "\Vhile the money to be paid in Harper was 
in the nature of a fee, the property taxpayer requirement 
in a general obligation bond election exists for the pur-
pose of limiting the vote to those electors who will re-
main legally liable to provide the funds for the payment 
of the bonds. This certainly could not be considered a 
fee paid for voting. The payment of taxes is to be made 
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irrespective of whether or not an election is pending. The 
Court in Harper emphasized that" [t]o introduce wealth 
or payment of a fee as measure of a voter's qualification 
is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor." This 
was the situation in Harper. But when a case does arise, 
like Cipria1z.o, in which the precondition to voting is a 
relevant factor to the classification, in which the precon-
dition is not at all capricious, the Harper ruling would 
Hot apply to it. This can be seen in the language of the 
Cipria;no decision. An examination of that decision in-
dicates that nowhere does the Court speak in the sweep-
ing language of Harper about the payment of moneys as 
a prerequisite to voting being conclusively a violation of 
the equal protection clause. To the contrary the Court 
initially recognized the inapplicability of such an ap-
proach and as heretofore pointed out in this brief assum-
ed arguendo that in some circumstances a state might 
limit the franchise to ''specially interested'' qualified 
roters. Assuming then, that such a limitation could be 
made, the Court explained that whether or not equal 
protection was denied those excluded from voting de-
pended upon whether or not they were substantially less 
i11terested or affected than those included. It must be 
~aid, therefore, that in a case such as Cipriano, or the 
case before this Court, the broad language of Harper is 
inapplicable. What is applicable is the test of whether 
or not those excluded from voting were substantially 
less interested or affected than those included, and the 
result of that test, as already discussed, must be a de-
termination that those excluded were indeed less interest-
ed or affected. 
17 
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Since the date of the Cipriarn.o decision, there hay1 
been several decisions rendered by both federal and state 
courts on the applicability of the opinions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Kramer and Cipriarno to 
the constitutionality of property taxpayer qualifications. 
At this writing, all of such decisions have not been offi. 
cially reported and by stipulation by counsel concurrently 
with the filing of this brief there have been filed with 
the Court copies of the opinions cited in this brief as 
to which official citations are not yet available so that 
the Court might examine the texts of those opinions. 
There is presently pending in the United States 
Supreme Court the case of City of Phoenix, Arizona, el 
al v. Emily Kolodziejski, No. 1066, October Term 1969, 
argued orally on March 31, 1970, and which is on appeal 
from a decision of the United States District Court for 
the District of Arizona, rendered on December 17, 1969, 
________ F, Supp. -------------------- (1969). In the Phoenix case, a 
three judge federal court enjoined the issuance of certain 
general obligation and revenue bonds voted at an election 
held in the City of Phoenix, Arizona, on June 10, 1969, 
at which only real property taxpayers were permitted 
to participate, on the ground that such election was held 
and conducted in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. The federal court treated the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Cipriano as controlling as to 
both general obligation and revenue bonds and simply 
stated that it could find "no evidence which would justify 
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a distiuction between revenue bonds and general obliga-
tion bonds.'' 
The Phoenix case was submitted to the United States 
Supreme Court by both parties on the theory that Ari-
zona law does not contain an election contest provision 
of the nature referred to and relied upon in the opinion 
handed down in the Cipriarno case, which as will be demon-
strated in Point II of this brief is a significant difference 
from the situation presented in this appeal. 
In Stewart et al v. The Parish School Board of the 
Parish of St. Charles et al, Civil No. 69-2818, U.S. Dis-
trict Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans 
Division, a three judge federal district court rendered 
a decision on February 25, 1970, ________ F. Supp. ----------------
(1970), holding that the statutes and Constitution of 
the State of Louisiana which limit the right to vote at 
general obligation bond elections to taxpayers to be in 
Yiolation of the Equal Protection Clause o.f the Four-
trenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. The Stewart decision involved a suit filed prior 
to the expiration of the 60-day peremption period with 
respect to the challenging of bond elections provided 
under Louisiana law and the court in that case applied 
its decision as to other bond elections prospectively from 
the date of its opinion. Notice of the appeal of the Stew-
art case to the United States Supreme Court has been 
filed by the defendant, Parish School Board. 
On the other hand, there have been four decisions 
in state courts decided since the Cipriarno decision which 
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have sustained property taxpayer qualifications as ap-
plied to general obligation bond elections. 
In Handy v. Pa.risk School Board of the Parish of 
Acadia, Civil No. 3042, Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, 
State of Louisiana, a three Judge court of appeal render-
ed a decision on April 30, 1970, holding that the provi-
sions of the Louisiana constitution and statutes which 
restrict the right to vote in general obligation bond elec-
tions to property taxpayers does not violate the Equal 
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Federal Constitution. In distinguishing the Phoenix case 
and disagreeing with the conclusions reached in the 
Stewart case, the court held that the owners of property 
who by law are required to pay the indebtedness have a 
''primary interest,'' as opposed to a ''remote'' or ''in-
direct" interest in the outcome of an election and that 
there exists a ''compelling state interest'' which justifies 
such constitutional and statutory provisions. 
In Muench v. Paine et al, 463 P.2d 939 (Idaho 1970), 
the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho denied a writ 
of prohibition seeking to prevent the issuance of certain 
school bonds and held in a well-reasoned opinion that 
the K ra.mer and Cipriano opinions did not determine the 
question of the application of the constitutional doctrine 
set forth in those cases to general obligation bonds. The 
Idaho Supreme Court then further held that because of 
the differences between bonds payable from the revenues 
of a project and those payable from property taxes which 
are secured by a lien on the property invoked, the non-
property taxpayers do not have such a real and substan-
20 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tial interest in the outcome of the general obligation 
bond election as property taxpayers have and therefore 
that the non-property owners as a class are substantially 
less affected by the outcome of a general obligation bond 
election than are property owners. 
In addition to the Muench and Handy cases, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court in two cases, Settle v. Board 
of County Commissioners of the County of Muskogee, 
462 P.2d 646 (Okla. 1970) and Settle v. The City of 
Jluskogee, 462 P.2d 642 (Okla. 1970), distinguished the 
Jecisions of Kramer and Cipriarrw and held that the tax-
payer requirement of Section 27 of Article 10 of the Okla-
homa Constitution properly limits the right to vote to 
those primarily interested and that the extent to which 
a non-property taxpayer is interested or affected is in-
direct and remote. 
It is submitted that the rationale adopted by the 
Louisiana Court in the Handy case and by the Oklahoma 
and Idaho courts holding that the Constitution of the 
United States does not invalidate state constitutional 
and statutory provisions which limit the right to vote at 
general obligation bond elections to taxpayers should be 
adopted by this Court in this appeal. 
It must be recognized, however, that as interpreted 
hy this Court in Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 83 Utah 278, 
28 P.2d 144 (1933) and in Wadsworth v. Santaquin, 83 
Utah 321, 28 P.2d 161 (1933), Article XIV, Section 3, of 
the Utah Constitution requires an election upon the is-
suance of revenue bonds where the revenues of an exist-
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ing public utility are to be pledged to the repayment of 
the bonds and as to which revenue bond election only 
property taxpayers may vote. The Cipriano deci1iion 
would appear to apply to the voting of revenue bonds 
under such circumstances in Utah, but it is submitted 
that the judgment of the court below in holding that the 
taxpayer election requirement is void and unconstitu-
tional as applied to all bond elections, not just revenue 
bond elections, is inapprop:fiate and should be reversed 
by this Court on this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELff\V ERRED IN EN-
JOINING THE ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS 
A S T H E PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT IS 
BARRED FROM ATTACKING THE VALID-
ITY OF THE ELECTION BY THE PROVI-
SIONS OF SECTION 11-14-12, UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The court below improperly assumed that the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in Cipriano 
governed the disposition of the allegation of the Plain-
tiff-Respondent which sought to declare the provisions 
of the Utah Constitution and statutes to be invalid as 
limiting the right to vote at a general obligation bond 
election to taxpayers. The United States Supreme Court 
in the Civriano decision stated that as to revenue bonds 
it would apply its decision only where under state law 
the time for challenging the election result had not then 
expired, or in cases brought within the time specified 
by state law for clrnlle11ging the election and which were 
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not yet final on June 16, 1969. The court below, treating 
a general obligation bond election as being subject to the 
prospective language of the CiprialYlo opinion, thus er-
roneously held that inasmuch as on June 16, 1969, the 
40-day election contest period prescribed in Section 11-
14-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, had not expired, the 
decision of the lower court dealing with the basic con-
stitutional question of the validity of taxpayer qualifi-
cations at general obligation bond elections would apply 
to the bond election of May 27, 1969. It is submitted that 
this is erroneous, that as demonstrated in Point I of this 
brief, the United States Supreme Court has not decided 
the constitutional question with respect to general obli-
gation bonds and that it was improper for the court 
below to disregard the fact that the 40-day election con-
test period of Section 11-14-12 had expired on July 14, 
1969, months before the filing of this action on December 
4, 1969, by the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
Section 11-14-12 (3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
contains the following language: 
''No contest shall be maintained and no bond 
election shall be set aside or held invalid unless a 
complaint is filed within the period prescribed in 
this section.'' 
It is the position of the Defendants-Appellants that 
it was the intention of the United States Supreme Court 
in the Cipria1Jio case to deal only with revenue bonds and 
that the language in the Cipriano opinion with respect 
to the passage of the state contest period on June 16, 
1969, cannot logically be applied to contests with respect 
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to general obligation bond elections. It is true that liti. 
gation is now pending in the United States Supremr 
Court on the question of the applicability of the consti-
tutional doctrine of the Kramer and Cipriano decisions to 
general obligation bond elections, but it is nevertheles~ 
submitted that in such a decision if the United States 
Supreme Court applies such doctrine to general obliga-
tion bonds it will undoubtedly establish a new prospective 
date for the application of its opinion to general obliga-
tion bonds. Inasmuch as the Phoenix case does not in-
volve a state election contest provision, such decision 
as will be demonstrated later on will not change the fact 
that as to the May 27, 1969 bond election the state con-
test period has expired barring Plaintiff-Respondent 
from seeking to enjoin the issuance of the bonds. 
Litigation arising with respect to the property tax-
payer requirement in general obligation bond elections 
held in the State of Louisiana both before and after the 
decision in the Cipriano case should be considered by this 
Court in determining whether the court below was cor-
rect in enjoining the issuance and sale of the bonds. It 
is urged that on the basis of the following discussed cases 
this Court should hold that the 40-day election contest 
period provided by Section 11-14-12 be applied to this 
litigation and that it hold that Plaintiff-Respondent is 
barred from bringing an action to enJom the issuance 
of the bonds. 
In the case of Andrieux v. East Baton Rouge Parish 
School Board, 227 So.2d 370 (La. 1969), suit was brought 
subsequent to the passage of the 60-day contest periorl 
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provided in Section 14 (n) of Article 14 of the Louisiana 
Constitution questioning the validity of general obliga-
tion bonds voted at a taxpayer election held prior to 
.June 16, 1969. The Louisiana Supreme Court, emphasiz-
ing that in Cipriano the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that state prescriptive or peremptive provi-
sions were valid as a bar to such attacks, held that even 
though the relief sought was for an alleged deprivation 
of federal constitutional rights, the suit could not be 
maintained if it was filed subsequent to the 60-day period 
following promulgation of the election results. Citing 
the Andrieux case, the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
Strick Chambers v. Road District No. 505 of Tarngipahoa 
Parish, Louisia!Yla, 229 So.2d 698 (La. 1969) sustained the 
dismissal by a trial court of a suit challenging the legality 
of a road district general obligation bond and tax election 
held on June 7, 1969, on Cipriano grounds because the 
litigation was not filed until after the passage of the 
GO-day peremption period. An application for a writ of 
eertiorari was filed in the United States Supreme Court, 
which application was denied by the United States Su-
preme Court on March 2, 1970. It is significant to note 
that on February 24, 1970, the Supreme Court of the 
United States noted probable jurisdiction in the Phoenix 
case dealing with the application o.f Cipriano to general 
obligation bonds where no defense was made under such 
a state contest period. 
In addition to the decision of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court mentioned above, in Hobbs v. Police Jury of More-
house Parish, Civil Action No. 14836, United States Dis-
25 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trict Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Shreve-
port Division,-------- F. Supp. ------------, (1970), a three judge 
federal district court on January 3, 1970, dismissed an 
action contesting a Louisiana general obligation bond 
election on the ground that only property taxpayers wer8 
permitted to vote, because a proper party plaintiff had 
not brought the action ·within the 60-day period subse-
quent to the date of the promulgation of the election re-
sult as required by Louisiana law. In the Hobbs case an 
improper party plaintiff (a non-taxpayer who was also 
not registered to vote) originally filed the suit within 
te 60-day period, and after te 60-day period had run the 
court denied an attempt to substitute a plaintiff who 
would have originally had standing to sue. In the de-
cision the federal district court characterized the Lou-
isiana 60-day period as peremptive, emphasizing that the 
lapse of the prescribed period operates as a complete 
extinguishment of the right to bring the action. 
The fundamental notion involved here, of permitting 
a state statute of limitations to apply to those rights of a 
complainant acquired from federal law is one recognized 
not only in the decision just mentioned by also one which 
has been clearly recognized in past decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. In O'Sullivan- v. Felix, 233 U.S. 
318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980 (1914), a plaintiff who was 
molested while attempting to vote at a general election 
brought a civil action which arose under a federal civil 
rights act. Faced with an attempt by the defendants to 
dismiss the action as one against which the state pre-
scriptive period had run, the Supreme Court made clear 
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that because "the action depends upon or arises under 
the laws of the United States does not preclude the appli-
cation of the statute of limitations of the state ... '' and 
that it was "therefore not necessary to pursue in detail 
the argument of plaintiff based on the postulate that 
'the Sovereign alone can limit the right of action ... ' " 
(at 233 U.S. 322) Similarly, see Baker v. F & F Invest-
ment (C.C.A. 7, 1970) 420 F.2d 1191, wherein the federal 
appellate court, citing 0 'Sullivan, found that an Illinois 
statute of limitations could apply to rights acquired from 
a federal act, the Court stating at page 1194 that "Limi-
tations on the period within which a right may be re-
dressed do not conflict with the existence of that right." 
This same approach of applying a state prescriptive 
period against federal rights has also been followed when 
those rights were acquired directly from the Federal 
Constitution and not merely from an act of Congress. 
In Benedict v. City of New York (C.C.A. 2, 1917) 247 
~~ed. 758, aff 'd 250 U.S. 321, 39 S.Ct. 476, 63 L.Ed. 1005 
(1919), the complaintant was the holder of certain un-
paid and overdue special assessment certificates of Long 
Island City, New York, and was suing the City of New 
York as the successor of Long Island City. The complain-
ant asserted rights acquired directly from the Federal 
Constitution, arguing that he had been deprived of his 
property without due process of law, and that the obliga-
tion of the contract under which the certificates sued upon 
were issued had been impaired by certain legislation of 
the State of New York. The plaintiff argued that a. trust 
in his favor had, therefore, been violated and that an 
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accounting and liability should be due him for its breach. 
It appeared from the facts that the City Treasurer had 
foreclosed upon and then sold certain land securing the 
assessments for an amount far less than the assessments 
themselves and also that the New York Legislature, sub-
sequent to the time of the issuance of the certificates 
' 
provided that lands securing the certificates could be 
purchased with certificates at par value. For purposes of 
reaching the defendant's statute of limitations argument, 
the Court of Appeals assumed the validity of the com-
plaint but found that it had been filed 17 years after 
the cause of action had accrued. Since both the state's 
six and its ten year statutes of limitations were violated, 
the Court found it unnecessary to choose which of the 
two was applicable to the facts, and instead merely de-
termined that the plaintiff had delayed too long in 
bringing the suit both under a statute of limitations 
theory and under the equitable doctrine of !aches. Citing 
0 'Sullivan, the Appellate Court stated at page 767: 
In the absence of any statute of limitations 
enacted by Congress, the federal courts of equity 
usually follow the state statutes; and they do this 
even in actions which depend upon or arise under 
the laws of the United States ... The complainant 
is here asserting an equitable right, and it is true 
that as a general rule the equity jurisdiction of 
the United States is not affected by state laws. 
That principle can not be invoked however to de-
prive a federal equity court of the power to refuse 
relief to a suitor whose right is barred by a state 
statute of limitations. Such statutes are not bind-
ing upon federal courts in suits in equity, yet 
those courts may and generally do apply the 
statutes upon principles of analogy; and such 
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statutes have been applied by these courts to 
claims against trustees. 
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr . 
.Justice Brandeis, affirmed the court below reemphasiz-
ing the significance of the state's statute of limitations 
in guiding a federal court of equity faced with an action 
on a. stale claim. 
On the basis of the foregoing cases, especially those 
decided since the Cipriano case, it is submitted that the 
proper approach for this Court to take is to hold that 
the Legislature of the State of Utah has concluded that 
there is a compelling interest in the state to see that at 
some time in the electoral process the election results 
become fixed and incontestable. Purchasers of bonds 
must have this assurance, and a failure of the state 
judiciary to recognize the prescriptive nature of the 
contest period would affect the market for municipal 
securities issued by Utah political subdivisions. There-
fore, it is requested that this court adopt the position 
tahn by the Louisiana Supreme Court and hold that 
the plaintiff had no right after July 14, 1969, to sue 
to enjoin the issuance of the bonds. This result is par-
ticularly applicable and should be followed by this 
Court in view of the fact that the basic constitutional 
question has not been heretofore decided by the United 
States Supreme Court. When the Phoenix case is de-
cided by the Supreme Court there is no reason now 
aYailable to believe that the court would in any way 
hold that its decision would apply to general obligation 
bond elections conducted subsequent to June 16, 1969. 
If this Court should affirm the decision of the trial 
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court in declaring that the constitutional and statutory 
provisions limiting the right to vote at bond elections 
to taxpayers does apply to general obligation bond elec-
tions, nevertheless it is submitted that this Court should 
in part reverse the judgment of the trial court and hold 
that since the action enjoining the issuance of the bonds 
was not properly and timely brought that the bonds in 
question may nevertheless be issued by the Defendants-
A ppellants. There is little to distinguish this case from 
the situation in the Chambers case, certiorari on which 
was denied a week subsequent to the noting of juris-
diction by the United States Supreme Court in the 
Phoenix case, and it is urged that this court adopt as 
to Utah bond elections the theory approved by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court as to Louisiana bond elections 
and which is fully supported by decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT 
IN HOLDING THAT TO THE EXTENT 
ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3, OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 11-14-2 
AND 11-14-5, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY RE-
QUIRING A TAXPAYER VOTE AT BOND 
ELECTIONS, SUCH PROVISIONS ARE 
SEVERABLE AND DEFENDANTS-APPEL-
LANTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO HOLD A 
GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND ELECTION 
AS LONG AS THE PROPOSITION IS NOT 
LIMITED TO TAXPAYERS. 
30 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
If subsequent to the decision in this case the United 
States Supreme Court should render a decision in the 
Phoenix case holding that it is not proper to limit the 
right to vote at general obligation bond elections to 
taxpayers only or if this Court should affirm the decision 
of the court below invalidating such provisions of Utah 
law then it is respectfully requested by Defendants-
Appellants that this Court affirm the holding of the 
court below that such provisions are severable and that 
bond elections at which all qualified electors are per-
mitted to vote may be conducted. In this connection 
it is desired to call this Court's attention to the pro-
"isions of Senate Bill No. 3 of the 1970 Session of the 
Utah Legislature, Chapter 4, Laws of Utah, 1970, 
wherein the Legislature of the State of Utah set forth 
as its intention and policy that if the provisions of the 
Utah Constitution which limit the right to vote at a 
bond election to the qualified electors of the municipality 
as shall have paid a property tax therein in the year 
preceding the election are removed by constitutional 
amendment or are held to be in violation of the Con-
stitution of the United States by this Court or by the 
Supreme Court of the United States then it is the 
PXpress intention of the Legislature that propositions 
for the issuance of bonds under the Utah Municipal 
Bond Act shall be submitted at an election at which 
all qualified electors may vote. 
1'he la\\' with respect to the maximum rate of interest 
which school bonds could bear in effect at the time the 
Defendants-Appellants adopted the resolution submitting 
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the bond proposition at the May 27, 1969, election wa, 
6% per annum. Recognizing the current high interest 
rates obtaining in the municipal bond market, the Utah 
Legislature has raised the maximum rate of interest 
which school bonds may bear to 8%. See Senate Bill 
No. 3, 1970 Session of the Utah Legislature, Chapter 
4, Laws of Utah, 1970. In view of the current bond 
market it is therefore entirely possible that if this Court 
should hold that the court below was in error when it 
enjoined the issuance of the bonds voted at the May 2i, 
1969, election, nevertheless it would be impossible to sell 
those bonds subject to a 6% voted interest rate. If this 
were to be the case, then it would be necessary for the 
Defendants-Appellants to submit a new proposition to 
the voters of the school district at a higher maximum 
interest rate. If a decision is reached in the Phoenix 
case, or in this case, or both, which should result in 
affirming the constitutional principle enunciated by the 
trial court below that the provisions limiting the right 
to vote to taxpayers are unconstitutional, then the 
Defendants-Appellants request that this Court provide 
guidance to Utah political subdivisions by affirming the 
holding of the trial court that such provisions are sever-
able and that a bond election may be legally held where 
the proposition is submitted to all qualified electors, in 
accordance with the policies established hy the Legis-
lature of the State of Utah in Senate Bill No. 3, supra. 
There are many other political subdivisions in the State 
of Utah which face the same problems of uncertainty 
which arise as to the resubmission of the bonds in this 
litigation. The Legislature has attempted to do all that 
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it can constitutionally do toward providing the necessary 
enabling legislation prior to a resolution of the con-
~titutional issues raised by the Cipriano case as far as 
general o bliga ti on bond elections are concerned prior 
to the actual decisions by this Court in this case and by 
the United States Supreme Court in the pending Phoenix 
ease. It is therefore respectfully requested that this 
Court provide guidelines to this school district and to 
other political subdivisions in the state who must under-
take honding programs in order that some indication 
may be had as to whether or not, absent a constitutional 
amendment, authority exists for the submission of bond 
propositions to all qualified electors of the political sub-
division involved as to both general obligation and 
revenue bond propositions if that is ultimately decided 
hy the courts of this land to be constitutionally required. 
Defendants-Appellants submit that the decision of 
the Court below on the question of severability is correct 
and that there is ample authority for a decision by this 
Court that the offending parts of the Constitution have 
Leen erased instanter from the Utah Constitution and 
that authority exists to hold bond elections and to permit 
all qualified electors to vote without the necessity of a 
rorn:;titutional amendment removing the off ending parts 
or further enabling legislation other than contained in 
Senate Bill No. 3, supra. Similar situations have arisen 
in the past regarding the abolition of state constitutional 
provisions required by United States constitutional 
amendments or interpretations of the courts. In People 
1'· Hulmes, 173 N.E. 145 (Ill. 1930), the Nineteenth 
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Amendment to the Constitution permitting women thl' 
right to vote was held by its own force to supersede ali 
inconsistent state and federal provisions without ques-
tioning the right of elections to be conducted permitting 
all qualified voters the right to vote. The Mississippi 
Supreme Court in Ratcliff v. Board of Supervisors, 193 
So.2d 137 (Miss. 1966), held that the judicial invalidation 
of the Poll Tax by the United States Supreme Court as 
a qualification of voting had only the effect of writing 
out of the state constitution such requirement. 
In order to prevent a further delay in the financing 
of needed public facilities, it is requested that this Court 
answer this question and affirm the holding of the court 
below that valid bond elections may now be conducted 
in the State of Utah at which all qualified electors may 
vote if by action of this Court or by action of the Supreme 
Court of the United States provisions in the Utah Con-
stitution and statutes limiting the right to vote to tax-
payers are declared to be unconstitutional. 
POINT IV 
ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT WITH 
RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE 
BONDS SHOULD BE MADE PROSPECTIVE 
ONLY. 
In the Cipriano case as noted in Point II, siipra, the 
United States Supreme Court recognized the necessity 
of making its decision with respect to revenue bonds 
prospective so as not to affect the validity of outstarnl-
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• 
ing bonds. Likewise, if this Court should find that the 
provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State 
of Utah violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
then in order to protect the credit of the various political 
subdivisions of the State of Utah and to prevent the 
casting of doubt on the validity of outstanding bonds 
issued by those political subdivisions it is respectfully 
requested that this Court, following the Cipriano decision 
and the court below, apply its decision in this case 
prospectively only. As in the Cipriano opinion the tech-
nique of making decisions prospective only has been 
adopted in recent years by various courts including this 
Court in Carter v. Bea.ver County Service .Area No. One, 
16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P .2d 440 ( 1965). A leading case 
decided by the United States Supreme Court is Great 
Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. 
287 U.S. 358 (1932) commented on in Schaefer, The Con-
trol of ''Sunbursts'': Techniques of Prospective Over-
ruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 631 (1967). This decision has 
been followed in many areas in addition to the Cipriano 
case, notably in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
A state decision discussing this problem is the Washing-
ton Supreme Court decision in State v. Martin, 284 P.2d 
833 (Wash. 1963) where the court overruled one of its 
prior decisions with respect to constitutional doctrine 
hut provided that the opinion would be applied pros-
pectively only with respect to outstanding bonds which 
had been issued under the prior construction of the 
constitution. 
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The court below held that its decision would apply 
only to bond elections where the contest period provided 
by Utah law had not expired on June 16, 1969. As has 
been argued in this brief, this Court should hold that 
the Cipriano date does not govern the validity of general 
obligation bond elections and therefore this Court should 
feel free to apply a new prospective date to the validity 
of bond elections. If the Supreme Court of the United 
States should decide this question by affirming the 
decision of the trial court in the Phoenix case and fix 
a new prospective date, that date would of course govern 
the validity of bonds and of bond elections in Utah. 
However, in absence of such a decision, it is requested 
that this Court make clear that it is the date of its 
decision rather than June 16, 1969, which governs the 
validity of general obligation bond elections and that 
its decision will be applied prospectively only. As to 
bonds which have been issued and are in the hands of 
holders, it is requested that this Court specifically state 
that any opinion or decision in this case affirming the 
trial court will not affect such bonds which have been 
actually issued and delivered prior to the date of such 
opm10n. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants-Appellants are faced with the need of 
obtaining the financing of additional school facilities 
through the issuance of school building bonds in order 
to provide the capital funds to pay the cost of such 
construction. It is requested that this Court reverse 
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the decision of the court below to the extent that it 
enjoins the issuance of the bonds by the Defendants-
Appellants voted at the May 27, 1969, election. As has 
been argued in this brief, it is submitted that irrespective 
of the constitutional doctrines of the Cipriano, Kramer 
and Harper decisions and whatever may be adopted 
by the United States Supreme Court in the pending 
Phoenix case, the passage of the 40-day election contest 
period provided by Utah law without challenge to the 
rnlidity of the bond election prevents any inquiry at 
this time into the validity of the bonds voted at the 
jfay 27, 1969, election and that as to such election there 
can be no constitutional question raised under state law. 
It is requested that this Court hold that any invalid 
provisions of the statutes and Constitution are severable 
and in such event that if necessary in order to sell the 
bonds voted at the May 27, 1969, election, a new election 
may be conducted in the Washington County School 
District at which all qualified electors may vote. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN ,V. PALMER 
Attorn,ey for AppeUoots 
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